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of World Demographic Change
By Richard Johnson
D
emographic changes over the next 50 years will affect the world
economy in many ways. Some of these effects will be benefi-
cial. In developing countries, for example, falling birthrates
will enable women to supply more paid labor and families to invest
more in the education of each child. Other demographic changes will
cause economic problems. In developed countries, population aging is
likely to imply government pension systems cannot continue with their
current rules. Population growth in developing countries could also
change patterns of world trade and thereby reduce the wages of some
workers in developed countries.
Economists have argued that policy changes are needed to maximize
the rewards of some demographic changes and reduce the negative
impacts of others. For example, governments of developing countries
may need to create more flexible labor markets if their increased female
workforce is to find employment. The governments of many developed
countries need to plan how much they will support the high number of
retirees expected in the future and communicate this plan to workers. 
Richard Johnson was formerly an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City. The article is on the bank’s website at www.kc.frb.org.
39This article describes aspects of predicted world demographic
changes that are likely to pose challenges for economic policy and
explores how policy could react to these changes. The first section sum-
marizes a forecast of world demographic changes up to 2050. The
second section discusses the economic effects of demographic changes in
developing countries, and the third section considers such effects in
developed countries. The fourth section examines the effects of demo-
graphic changes on world trade and capital flows. The article concludes
that the economic effects of such changes will depend heavily on future
government policy. In particular, the effect of population growth in
developing countries will depend on whether their governments’ policies
encourage economic growth. Government policy in developed countries
will affect the size and distribution of problems created by population
aging but will not be able to remove these problems altogether. 
I.  SUMMARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS’ 2002
WORLD POPULATION FORECAST
The most widely used population forecasts are those produced by the
United Nations. This section summarizes the latest U.N. forecast for
world population change to 2050. It concentrates on two aspects of this
forecast, the rate of population growth and the dependency ratio, the
ratio of people of non-working age to those of working age. These aspects
of demographic change are likely to have important economic effects. In
general, the forecasts for developing countries follow one pattern, while
those for developed countries follow another. An appendix to this article
considers the reliability of long-term population forecasts.
Population growth
The United Nations expects world population to grow rapidly
between 2000 and 2050. Over this period it predicts the world’s popula-
tion will grow from 6.1 to 8.9 billion, or by 47 percent (Chart 1). While
the forecast is for rapid population growth, growth would in fact be
slower than that observed between 1950 and 2000. Slower growth reflects
40 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYa decrease in the fertility rate—the number of births per woman’s lifetime.
Due to continued declines in world fertility rates, the U.N. expects the
world’s population to start decreasing steadily later this century.
Chart 2 shows the U.N.’s population forecast by countries’ level of
economic development. This article defines a country’s level of eco-
nomic development by its GDP per capita in 2000, a different
definition than that used by the U.N.1 The developed countries are
defined as those with per capita GDP above $10,000 per year. The less
developed countries are those with per capita GDP between $500 and
$10,000 per year, while the least developed countries are those with per
capita GDP below $500 per year. 
The U.N. predicts, in general, that the more economically devel-
oped a country is today, the slower its population will grow. The
population of the developed countries, for example, is expected to rise
fairly little between 2000 and 2050, from 0.9 to 1 billion. This slow rise
reflects the fact that more developed countries have lower fertility rates.
The difference in fertility rates has a greater effect on population growth
than higher life expectancies in more developed countries. 
ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2004 41
Chart 1
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Countries with lower per capita GDP, in contrast, are expected to
grow fairly rapidly. Excluding China, the population of the less devel-
oped countries is expected to rise from 1.9 to 2.5 billion. The
population of the least developed countries, including India and much
of Africa, is expected to grow very rapidly between 2000 and 2050,
from 2.1 to 4 billion. Rapid population growth is predicted in Africa,
despite the effects of HIV/AIDS (see box on next page).
There are some exceptions to the generalization that the U.N.
expects slower population growth in more developed countries. For
example, the U.N. expects the U.S. population to grow strongly, from
285 million in 2000 to 409 million in 2050, largely due to immigration.
The U.N. also predicts rapid population growth in most predominantly
Muslim countries, including the richer OPEC members.
In contrast, the U.N. expects slow population growth in China and
population declines in many of the former Soviet states, including
Russia. While China is a less developed country, the U.N. expects its
population to grow only marginally from 2000 to 2050, from 1.3 to
1.4 billion. Thus, China’s population forecast is similar to that for
Chart 2
WORLD POPULATION, FORECAST FOR 2000-2050, BY
LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT IN 2000
Source: United Nations (2003a)
Population, billions
























Least-developed countriesECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2004 43
developed countries. The former Soviet states’ low per capita GDP
implies that they, like China, are less developed countries. Despite these
exceptions, overall, predicted rates of population growth are negatively
correlated with countries’ current levels of development.
THE EFFECT OF HIV/AIDS ON AFRICA’S
POPULATION AND ECONOMY
A cursory reading of newspapers might suggest that HIV/AIDS will reduce
Africa’s population. In fact, the U.N. only expects population to decline in some coun-
tries in southern Africa, where the disease is most prevalent. Some countries further
north, such as Uganda, have had considerable success in reducing rates of HIV infec-
tion. Due to this success, and high fertility rates throughout Africa, the continent is
forecast to experience very rapid population growth. The U.N. predicts Africa’s popu-
lation will grow by 127 percent, or over 1 billion, between 2000 and 2050. 
Trends in total population, however, reflect only part of the impact of
HIV/AIDS. In some countries in southern Africa where population is expected to
rise, life expectancies at birth are expected to fall below 35 years between 2000 and
2010. The number of orphans is growing in these worst-affected countries, where
currently around 10 percent of children below 15 years of age have lost at least one of
their parents (Grassley and Timaeus).
High rates of HIV/AIDS infection are likely to reduce GDP through several
channels. Higher mortality will lead to slower labor-force growth, reduced average
levels of worker experience, and lower educational attainment, since orphanhood
raises the probability that children will drop out of school. Studies of countries with
high infection rates typically estimate the disease will reduce annual rates of GDP
growth by one to two percentage points (U.N. 2003b). Surprisingly, some studies
also find that HIV/AIDS will slightly raise rates of per capita GDP growth, since
reduced labor-force growth will mean each surviving worker has more capital to work
with and is thus more productive. By contrast, other studies find that the disease will
reduce growth of per capita GDP. 
In summary, HIV/AIDS is likely to restrain growth in Africa’s population and
reduce growth of its GDP. The overall demographic forecast for the continent,
however, is for rapid population growth.44 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Dependency ratios
The forecasts of dependency ratios to 2050 also differ greatly
according to each country’s level of development. The dependency ratio
is commonly defined as the ratio of people under age 15 and over age
64 to those age 15-64. A higher dependency ratio could increase the
burden that children and retirees place on people of working age, both
through tax-financed transfers and within-family care. Dependency
ratios are expected to fall in the least developed countries, remain stable
in the less developed countries, rise in China, and rise sharply in the
developed countries (Chart 3).
Both the rise in dependency ratios in the more developed countries
and the fall in dependency ratios in the least developed countries reflect
falling fertility rates and rising life expectancies. The same phenomena
affect the dependency ratio differently in these two groups of countries
because they have been occurring for different lengths of time. For
example, an increase in a country’s life expectancy from 50 to 55 increases
its supply of workers and reduces its dependency ratio, but an increase
from 70 to 75 increases its number of dependents and its dependency
Chart 3
DEPENDENCY RATIOS OF WORLD REGIONS,
FORECAST 2000-2050
Note: Dependency ratio = (population under 15 + population over 64)/population 15 to 64.
Source: United Nations (2003a)
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ratio. Similarly, a fall in fertility rates initially reduces the number of chil-
dren and thus dependents. After a longer period, however, a fall in fertility
rates also reduces the number of workers. Thus, trends in fertility and life
expectancy imply that eventually all countries will experience the rising
dependency ratios that the more developed countries currently face. 
Overall, despite some exceptions, the U.N.’s population forecasts
imply rapid population growth and falling dependency ratios in the
developing countries and slow population growth and rising depend-
ency ratios in the developed countries. Because these forecasts differ, the
next two sections focus on the economic effects of demographic change
in developing countries and developed countries, respectively.
II.  DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
Over time, economists have moved away from the theory that pop-
ulation growth is economically harmful. History shows that population
and living standards usually grow at the same time. A puzzle for theory,
however, is why many developing countries’ economies have grown
slowly in the recent past. Many economists believe that government
institutions and policies are responsible for some countries’ slow growth,
and thus that institutional reforms would increase economic growth in
these countries. At the same time, economists believe a declining share of
children in the population can bring several economic benefits, but only
to countries with appropriate economic policies. Thus, the economic
effects of demographic change in developing countries appear highly
contingent on these countries’ future institutions and policies.
Population growth in economic theory
The theory that population growth reduces living standards was
most famously proposed by Thomas Malthus in 1798. He argued that
growth in output per person was largely impossible, because humans
reproduced faster than they could increase economic output. For this
reason, he was an early advocate of birth control. Most developing46 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
countries have policies to lower their rates of population growth (U.N.
2001), which suggests their governments have some sympathy for the
idea that rapid population growth is harmful. 
Today, economists generally believe Malthus’ model has little rele-
vance to modern economies, however, because it contains no role for
capital or technology in allowing output to grow. Instead, most econ-
omists now believe population growth has a neutral or positive effect
on living standards. This view is based primarily on the neoclassical
growth model, which recognizes that capital and technology are also
important in the production process. In this model, the same level of
output per worker can be sustained for a labor supply of any size, so
long as investment is sufficient to keep the ratio of capital to workers
constant.2 In addition, advances in technology will increase output
per person. 
Whether Malthus’ view or the neoclassical model is correct is an
empirical question. Since the Industrial Revolution, in roughly 1800,
both populations and living standards have increased rapidly in the
United States and Europe. Living standards have also grown rapidly in
parts of East Asia over the last 50 years. These experiences support the
neoclassical model, with the level of technology increasing rapidly over
time. Thus, most economists think that the neoclassical model is
roughly correct and that population growth need not prevent living
standards from growing rapidly.
Malthus’ prediction that living standards will not improve over
time does, however, describe the recent experience in some countries.
For example, real per capita GDP has fallen fairly steadily in many
African countries since 1974 (Artadi and Sali-i-Martin). The same is
true in many OPEC countries since 1980.3 Many of these countries
also expect rapid population growth to 2050. 
Economists disagree as to whether weak economic performance in
Africa and some other countries suggests Malthus’ view is roughly
correct in these countries. Sachs (2001) argues that unfavorable geogra-
phy makes slow economic growth the natural condition of many poor
countries. For example, landlocked countries face high costs of engaging
in international trade, and malaria may deter investment in some equa-
torial countries. In contrast, Rodrik, Subramainiam, and Trebbi argue
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some countries’ economic growth has been slow. It is difficult to estab-
lish statistically which of the “geographic” and “institutional” theories
best explains slow growth in poor countries. However, Sachs (2001)
agrees that institutions have some effect on rates of economic growth. 
Economic effects of population growth
Population growth tends to be concentrated in poor countries, and
its economic effects will depend on the relative importance of geogra-
phy and institutions. Under the geographic theory, population growth
is likely to reduce average living standards in poor countries unless they
receive large transfers from developed countries. However, this view
appears to be a minority view among economists and policymakers.
The heavy emphases on institutional performance in the World Bank’s
2003 Development Report and in the Bush administration’s Millen-
nium Challenge Account—a new foreign aid program—suggest the
majority view is that countries’ economic performance will depend
more on the quality of their markets and governments.
The dependence of a country’s economic performance on the quality
of its institutions has both positive and negative implications. A positive
implication would be that some countries could improve their economic
performance with little outside aid, much as China has done since
turning toward markets and trade in 1979. A negative implication would
be that little economic growth can be expected in countries where politi-
cal instability is endemic. Population growth in these countries could thus
prevent living standards from growing and lead many citizens to attempt
to migrate to richer countries. The U.N. expects the populations of some
of the least politically stable countries, such as the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Liberia, and Somalia, to more than double between 2000 and
2050. Therefore, increasing the quality of governance in these countries
will become an increasingly important, if difficult, task. 
Economic effects of declining dependency ratios
A declining share of children in the population, and thus a declin-
ing dependency ratio, may temporarily increase rates of economic
growth in many developing countries. Thus, the effect of the decline in48 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
dependency ratios as birthrates fall is often called the “demographic div-
idend.” Falling birthrates would allow women to spend less time caring
for children and thus to spend more time in the paid labor force. A
movement of women into the labor force would temporarily increase
rates of growth in the labor force and thus in measured economic
output. Economies could also benefit in less direct ways from a lower
share of children in the population. For example, smaller family sizes
would allow parents to invest more in the education of each of their
children. Bloom and Williamson attribute a third of East Asia’s growth
in income per capita from 1965 to 1990 to the demographic dividend. 
The impetus to economic growth from declining dependency
ratios, however, appears also to depend on government policy. Many
Latin American countries experienced declining dependency ratios
during the past 40 years without enjoying the rapid economic growth
of East Asian countries. For example, between 1950 and 2000, the
dependency ratios of Japan and Brazil both fell by about 10 percentage
points. Yet growth in per capita GDP was much faster in Japan, where
it averaged 5.4 percent per year, than in Brazil, where it averaged 2.9
Chart 4
DEPENDENCY RATIOS AND GDP PER CAPITA, BRAZIL
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percent (Chart 4). Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla argue that recurrent
financial crises and high trade tariffs reduced the size of Latin America’s
demographic dividend from its falling dependency ratios.
Policy responses to demographic change in developing countries
The appropriate policy response to population growth in poor
countries will depend on why many of these countries’ economies
have grown slowly in the past. If unfavorable geography is the primary
cause of slow growth, improving living standards in many poor coun-
tries may require large subsidies from developed countries and
investments in technologies to overcome, say, tropical diseases (Sachs
2003). Policies to reduce population growth in poor countries might
also be consistent with a pessimistic view of their potential for eco-
nomic growth. While the World Bank does not advocate restricting
population growth as a policy goal, it does advocate greater access of
women to education, which often is associated with reduced popula-
tion growth.
In contrast, if poor institutional performance is responsible for
many developing countries’ poor economic growth, institutional reform
might allow populations and living standards to grow at the same time.
For example, the IMF (2003b) stresses that reducing government cor-
ruption, enforcing private property rights, and limiting the power of
political leaders would increase rates of economic growth in many
developing countries. Developing countries may also need to increase
the flexibility of their labor markets if a large increase in the number of
female workers is to lead to greater employment overall.
If institutions and policies are crucial to economic prospects in
poor countries, policymakers in developed countries may wish to
encourage some poor countries to change their policies. Such encour-
agement could take the form of making aid conditional on good
governance and economic freedom. For example, the Bush adminis-
tration has proposed that its new Millennium Challenge Account
would only give aid to countries scoring highly on World Bank
indexes of governance quality (Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi). Such
conditions may, however, suffer from a lack of credibility. Govern-
ments of very poor countries may doubt that developed countries will50 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
carry out their threats of withholding aid. Such a lack of credibility
would reduce incentives for governments in poor countries to
perform better.
III.  DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES
Compared with developing countries, developed countries face a
very different set of demographic changes and resultant economic pres-
sures. All developed countries expect their dependency ratios to increase
over the next 50 years. Some also expect their populations to decline.
Rising dependency ratios are likely to make government pension and
health insurance systems insolvent unless public policies change. Some
economists have also suggested that rising dependency ratios might
cause stock prices to fall. A variety of solutions to the problems of gov-
ernment pension and health insurance systems have been proposed. All
solutions are likely to reduce the income of some generations of
workers. The issue of declining stock prices has received less attention,
in part because this prediction has been strongly contested.
Table 1
POPULATION INCREASE IN THE G-8 COUNTRIES, 
U.N. FORECAST 2000-2050
Population (millions) Percent change
2000 2050
U.S. 285 408.7 43.4
Canada 30.8 39.1 27
UK 58.7 66.2 12.7
France 59.3 64.2 8.3
Germany 82.3 79.1 -3.8
Japan 127 109.7 -13.6
Italy 57.5 44.9 -22
Russia 145.6 101.5 -30.3
Source: United Nations (2003a)ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2004 51
Demographic change in the G-8 countries
Overall, the population of the more developed countries is expected
to increase slightly between 2000 and 2050, but expected growth rates
vary widely across countries. For example, Table 1 shows the U.N.’s
population forecast for the G-8 countries, which are the seven largest
developed economies, plus Russia. (Although Russia was a less devel-
oped country in 2000, it is included in Table 1 since its size and
political importance may make its demographic forecast of interest.)
The predicted changes in population range from a 43 percent increase
in the United States to a 30 percent decrease in Russia. Germany, Italy,
and Japan are also expected to lose population by 2050, though more
slowly than Russia. These population declines reflect low birth rates,
which also tend to increase dependency ratios.
The U.N. expects dependency ratios to increase by 2050 in devel-
oped countries overall. Rich countries have rising dependency ratios
both because their birthrates have fallen and because their life expectan-
cies have risen over time. Table 2 shows the expected increase in
dependency ratios in each of the G-8 countries. The expected increases
range from a fairly modest nine percentage points in the United States to
Table 2
DEPENDENCY RATIOS IN THE G-8 COUNTRIES, 2000
AND FORECAST FOR 2050, PERCENT
2000 2050 Increase
U.S. 51.7 61 9.3
Canada 46.2 69.8 23.6
UK 53.6 65 11.4
France 53.4 73.3 19.9
Germany 46.8 75.7 28.9
Japan 46.6 98.4 51.8
Italy 47.9 90.1 42.2
Russia 43.9 70.9 27.1
Note: The dependency ratio is defined as the population under age 15 plus the population over age
64 divided by the population age 15-64.
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a massive 52 percentage points in Japan. A comparison of Tables 1 and 2
shows that countries with slower population growth, such as Japan, Italy,
and Germany, tend to have larger increases in their dependency ratios.
While net immigration to developed countries could restrain the
rises in their dependency ratios, the U.N.’s forecast already assumes
some migration to these countries. Table 3 shows the U.N.’s forecast of
immigration rates to the G-8 countries in 2000-05. The U.N. expects
immigration rates to stay close to these figures through 2050. Canada
and the United States have the highest immigration rates relative to
their populations. Japan and Russia, however, allow very little immigra-
tion, which contributes to their sharply rising dependency ratios and
declining populations. 
Economic effects of demographic change
The forecast decline in population in some developed countries
may have both economic benefits and disadvantages. Benefits might
include lower levels of crowding and congestion. The disadvantages
might include higher costs per person of servicing the public debt and
of providing public goods, such as national defense. The largest disad-
Table 3
RATES OF NET IMMIGRATION TO G-8 COUNTRIES,
FORECAST FOR 2000-2005
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vantage of population decline, however, is likely to be its tendency to
raise dependency ratios and thus cause funding problems for govern-
ment pension and health insurance systems.
Rising dependency ratios create problems for many government
pension systems because these systems are unfunded, meaning they
hold few assets and thus must pay benefits directly from incoming
taxes. An increasing dependency ratio both reduces incoming revenues
and increases the number of pensions to be paid from those revenues.
Unless higher tax rates, rapid wage growth, or a high rate of immigra-
tion increase revenues, the system will lack the funds to pay the
pensions it has promised.
Government health insurance systems are likely to face similar
funding problems, since they also typically pay benefits directly from
taxes on workers. Population aging will reduce the growth rate of the
labor force and thus of tax revenues. It is also likely to greatly increase
demands for government spending on healthcare, since older people
consume a relatively large share of medical care. For these reasons, in
the long run the U.S. Medicare program is expected to represent a
greater share of U.S. GDP and to face greater funding problems than
Social Security (Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees).
Some economists are also concerned that the retirement of the baby-
boom generation could cause a “stock price meltdown.”  Theoretical
models suggest that, because workers wish to hold many assets as they
approach retirement, but fewer after they retire, the retirement of the
baby-boom generation could decrease the demand for assets and thus
cause asset prices to fall (Abel). However, empirical studies find little effect
of demographic changes on asset prices; a host of other shocks appear to
be more important (Poterba). Thus, there is no consensus within the eco-
nomics profession that any such stock-price meltdown will occur.
In addition, some past predictions of asset-price changes based on
demographic trends have proven highly inaccurate. For example, in
1989 Mankiw and Weil predicted that demographic change would
reduce real house prices in the United States for the next 20 years. This
prediction was based on the projected decline in the number of people
age 20 to 30, who typically have high demand for housing. The strong
rise in housing prices since 1989 suggests that, while demographics may
affect house prices, other variables, such as the level of private wealth54 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
and the rate of economic growth, are more important. The inaccuracy
of this prediction suggests that forecasts of demographic effects on stock
prices may also be unreliable.
Policy responses to increasing dependency ratios
Developed countries might make several policy changes in response
to rising dependency ratios. These changes could include liberalizing
immigration laws, encouraging higher birth rates, raising taxes on
workers, and reducing pension and health benefits. The funding prob-
lems of government pension and health insurance systems, however, are
expected to be severe. For example, Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Leibfritz cal-
culated the permanent reductions in all government transfer programs,
starting in 1995, that would have been required for taxation at then-
current rates to fund all government transfer programs. They found that
the United States, Germany, and Japan would have needed to reduce all
transfers by 20, 18, and 29 percent, respectively. Italy would have needed
to cut transfers by 41 percent, due to the large increase expected in its
dependency ratio and its generous government pension system.4 Prob-
lems of this size would be difficult to solve by changing any one policy.
Some developed countries might attempt to increase tax revenues by
admitting more young immigrants. For example, Canada admits many
immigrants and attempts to admit only those immigrants likely to pay
the most net taxes over their lifetimes.5 A policy of paying for pensions
through higher immigration, however, would face some problems. Stabi-
lizing dependency ratios would require very heavy immigration. For
example, the United States would have to increase its number of new
immigrants from its current 1.25 million per year to 12 million per year
to maintain its current ratio of people aged 65 and over to people age 15-
64 (U.N. 2000). Further, making Social Security payments to these
immigrants after they retire would require even heavier immigration later. 
A close substitute for higher immigration would be higher birth
rates in developed countries. There is indeed some interest in European
countries in policies to raise birth rates.6 However, there is also interest
in the same countries in reducing crowding by restricting population
growth. Since many European countries expect large increases in the
number of old people, large increases in birthrates and populationsECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2004 55
would be required to stabilize government pension and healthcare
systems. Therefore, the goals of stabilizing the ratio of old to young and
restricting population growth are incompatible. As a result, reforms to
pension and health insurance systems are likely to be necessary.
Raising taxes on workers could allow governments to pay their
future pension liabilities. Such tax increases would hurt workers and
increase distortions in labor markets. European countries fear that raising
their pension taxes gives incentives for workers to migrate to countries
with lower pension taxes. Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser also find that
higher tax rates would reduce the national saving rate by redistributing
funds from workers, who tend to have high saving rates, to retirees, who
tend to have low or even negative saving rates. Many plans to privatize
the U.S. Social Security system would also effectively raise taxes, by invit-
ing workers to save more in order to get roughly the same benefits Social
Security had previously promised them (Feldstein and Samwick). 
Reducing pension benefits, perhaps by raising the age at which they
become available, would obviate the need for tax increases. Lower
pension benefits would hurt current retirees and older workers but help
later generations of workers, who would pay lower tax rates and suffer
fewer labor-market distortions. Later generations would also live in an
economy with higher private saving, a larger capital stock, and thus
higher wages. Analyses of privatization plans typically find that future
generations would benefit greatly from reforms that somewhat reduced
incomes of initial cohorts of retirees (Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser).
Perhaps because there would be both winners and losers from
Social Security reform, economists disagree about the correct response
to the current system’s problems. Diamond recommends Social Security
reforms that maintain the system’s current structure. He emphasizes this
structure has appealing aspects, such as a low cost of managing workers’
contribution records. By contrast, Feldstein and Samwick propose par-
tially replacing Social Security with individual asset-holding accounts. A
related approach would be simply to cut benefits and allow individuals
to set up their own saving vehicles. If governments chose this option,
they would need to tell workers not to expect government support in
their retirement, since any such expectation would reduce workers’
incentives to save for their own retirement.56 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
In summary, projected dependency ratios mean developed countries
are likely either to cut pension and health benefits for older people, raise
taxes on workers, or do some of each. Higher immigration and birth
rates might alleviate the problems of pay-as-you-go government health
and pension systems, but are unlikely to solve them entirely. Analyses of
government health and pension systems commonly conclude that the
longer tax increases or benefit reductions needed to make these systems
sustainable are delayed, the larger they will need to be. Thus, the gains
and losses from pension reform will depend both on how pensions are
reformed and how soon policymakers act to reform them.
IV. EFFECTS OF WORLD DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE
ON TRADE AND CAPITAL FLOWS
Differing patterns of demographic change in developing and devel-
oped countries may also affect international trade and capital flows.
Population growth in developing countries may lead them to export
many manufactured goods at low prices. Population aging in developed
countries may lead them to lend funds to developing countries. In
developed countries, these changes are likely to benefit most citizens
but hurt some workers. Policymakers in developed countries may wish
to compensate these workers, while retaining the overall benefits of free
trade. In developing countries, policymakers may wish to adopt policies
that encourage inflows of funds from developed countries. 
International effects of population growth in developing countries
Economic theory predicts that countries with large populations but
little physical capital will export labor-intensive goods. Thus, if develop-
ing countries’ populations grow faster than their capital stocks, they
may tend to become heavy exporters of simple manufactured goods
such as textiles. This will tend to reduce the prices of these goods and
the wages of low-skilled labor worldwide. This theory appears to be a
good description of trade between China and the United States. 
In contrast to China, however, some populous countries export
relatively little. For example, of all world merchandise exports in 2001,
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(WTO). In the inland areas of both countries, a lack of infrastructure
often makes manufacturing for export unprofitable. As each country’s
infrastructure improves, however, such activity will become profitable
further inland, allowing more of each country’s population to interact
with the world economy. Thus, over the next 50 years, investment in
infrastructure in populous developing countries is likely to affect the
world economy in much the same way as would a large increase in
their populations. 
The international effects of population growth in developing coun-
tries are likely to be similar to those of China’s entry into world trade. An
increasing orientation toward trade in developing countries would also
bring more low-income workers into contact with the world economy. It
is probably too early to assess the actual impact of China’s entry into the
WTO on world trade. However, in a computer simulation study, Wang
found that China’s entry would reduce world prices of many manufac-
tured goods. This price reduction would benefit most citizens of
developed countries but would reduce the incomes of some manufactur-
ing workers in these countries. The study also found China’s WTO entry
would benefit many African countries by increasing demand for their
exports of primary goods. However, the national income of some Latin
American countries, including Mexico, would fall, since the prices of
their manufactured exports to the United States would decline. Thus,
some countries could lose from population growth or an increased ori-
entation toward trade in developing countries. 
International effects of population aging
Economists have used computer models to study the international
effects of population aging. In these models, workers save heavily as
they approach retirement and sell their assets after retiring. This behav-
ior leads each country’s national saving rate to rise as its baby-boom
generation approaches retirement and then fall after it retires. Because
savers would not wish to hold only domestic assets, a higher national
saving rate would lead developed countries to lend funds abroad. For
example, in a model which assumes capital can flow throughout the
world, the United States, the EU, and Japan all lend heavily to develop-
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developed countries are saving heavily (Brooks). Later, when the baby
boomers have retired and start to sell their assets, all three economies
become net borrowers from developing countries. 
The predictions of these computer models, however, may not be
reliable. Careful analysis of data suggests demographic change has only
a small effect on national saving rates (Deaton and Paxson). Saving rates
can also change for other reasons. For example, if consumer credit
becomes more widely available, consumers may not need to save as
much in order to buy durable goods such as cars or houses. Therefore,
economists disagree as to whether demographic changes will induce the
changes in national saving rates that existing computer studies predict. 
Perhaps the most important insight from computer models of
capital flows is the potential gain from savers in developed countries
investing abroad. In theory, returns to capital will be highest in develop-
ing countries, where capital is scarce and wages are low. Investment in
developing countries by savers from rich countries would therefore
benefit retirees in rich countries and workers in poor countries, and
reduce incentives for workers to migrate from poor to rich countries. A
diversion of investment away from developed countries, however, would
reduce wages for workers in developed countries. In reality, political
instability and poor protection of property rights often deter savers from
investing in the developing world. Therefore, many of the potential gains
from such investment are not realized. 
Policy responses to international effects of demographic change
Population growth in developing countries could reduce the wages
of some workers in developed countries, which might provoke calls for
policy responses. However, these responses may not all be good ones. In
particular, in most economic models, tariffs are an inefficient means of
reaching any desired distributional goal because tariffs only tax domes-
tic consumers of the imported good (Saez). A more appropriate policy
response might be to raise income taxes slightly and use the resulting
revenues to help workers hurt by low-wage foreign competition. 
The potential gains from investment in developing countries suggest
that policymakers in these countries may wish to reduce the risks faced
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by increasing political stability, by protecting property rights more effec-
tively, and by promising credibly that future tax rates on capital will be
low. While such promises may prevent policymakers in developing
countries from reaching short-run distributional goals, an increase in
investment could raise living standards substantially in the long run. 
V. CONCLUSION
Forecasts of world population include three changes that may have
large economic effects. First, many developing countries expect rapid
population growth. Second, many developing countries also expect
their birthrates to fall. Third, many developed countries and China
expect rapid aging of their populations. 
Government policies will greatly affect the consequences of demo-
graphic change in developing countries. In particular, developing
countries can achieve more rapid economic growth, despite high rates of
population growth, if their governments create better-functioning
markets and protect property rights more effectively. Without such
policy improvements, rapid growth in developing countries’ populations
is likely to lead to continued slow economic growth and increased incen-
tives for migration from poor to rich countries. Falling rates of childbirth
can also increase countries’ rates of economic growth, especially if these
countries remain open to trade and have stable financial markets. 
Developed countries have less potential to escape the problems of
population aging simply by changing their policies. All plausible
reforms to their government pension and health insurance systems
would hurt some individuals. However, studies of possible reforms also
show that policymakers’ approaches to pension reforms will greatly
affect the distribution of gains and losses from these reforms and the
level of economic output in the long run. 60 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
APPENDIX: 
HOW RELIABLE IS THE U.N.’S POPULATION FORECAST?
One approach to estimating the accuracy of a prediction is to
examine the record of the forecaster making it. The U.N.’s forecasts of the
world’s population have been highly accurate. Of 11 U.N. forecasts from
1957 to 1996 of the world’s population in 2000, all were too high, but
the average error was only 2.8 percent (National Research Council). The
U.N.’s forecasts of individual countries’ populations have been less accu-
rate. In the same 11 forecasts, absolute errors in projected country
populations averaged just 4.8 percent in five-year projections but 17
percent in 30-year projections. Errors have been larger for predictions
further in the future and for less developed countries. In developed coun-
tries, the U.N. and national statistics agencies have forecast the size of
working-age populations fairly accurately but the size of very young and
very old populations much less accurately (Keilman). These differences
arose because demographers underestimated declines in fertility rates and
the extent of increases in longevity. 
Another method of assessing the accuracy of a forecast is to examine
the plausibility of its underlying assumptions. The assumed fertility rate, or
the average number of times women give birth during their lifetimes, is
important in determining long-run population growth. In developed
countries, the average number of births per lifetime necessary to prevent
population decline without immigration—the “replacement level” of fer-
tility—is around 2.1. Fertility rates have fallen dramatically in many
developed countries during the last 50 years, and in general the U.N.
expects fertility rates to continue to decline. Perhaps anomalously, however,
the U.N. predicts that fertility rates will rise in the countries where they are
lowest today, so that all countries will have fertility rates of at least 1.85 in
2050. For example, fertility rates in Germany, Japan, and Russia are
expected to rise from around 1.2 now to 1.85 in 2050. If recent downward
trends in fertility were not reversed to such an extent, the U.N.’s projec-
tions would overstate future fertility rates and, in turn, overstate
population in countries where fertility rates are at present very low. 
The reliability of a forecast may also be assessed by comparing it to
other forecasts. The U.S. Census Bureau’s forecasts of the world’s popu-
lation to 2050 provide a useful comparison with the U.N.’s projections.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2004 61
Overall the Census Bureau’s 2003 forecasts are very similar to the U.N.’s.
The Census Bureau predicts a world population in 2050 of 9.1 billion,
less than 2 percent higher than the U.N. It expects growth rates to differ
across regions similarly to the U.N. and also assumes fertility rates will
rise substantially in the lowest-fertility countries. There are some large
differences between the Census Bureau and U.N. forecasts of the popu-
lations in 2050 of the countries with the fastest population growth
between 2000 and 2050, but these do not appear to follow any consis-
tent pattern. Indeed, past experience has shown that population growth
in fast-growing poor countries is particularly hard to predict. Thus, a
comparison of the U.N. and Census Bureau forecasts does not identify
any aspect of the former as being controversial but reinforces the sense
that population forecasts for fast-growing, developing countries may
turn out to be either considerably too high or too low.62 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ENDNOTES
1GDP data are taken from IMF (2003a) and the World Bank.  These sources
omit GDP data for some countries.  This paper assumes that Afghanistan, Iraq,
Liberia, North Korea, and Somalia are least-developed countries and that small
European states such as Andorra and Monaco are more developed countries.  The
U.N.’s definitions of more, less, and least developed are based on a country’s level
of development in 1950.  This results in some anomalies relative to current levels
of development.  For example, the U.N. defines the Ukraine as a developed coun-
try and South Korea as less developed, despite South Korea having GDP per
capita 15 times as high as the Ukraine in 2000.
2Other more recent models imply that faster population growth increases
rates of technological advance, since larger markets create greater incentives for
new inventions (Kremer, 1990).
3IMF data (IMF 2003a) show that per capita GDP was lower in 2003 than
in 1980 in OPEC members Algeria, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Kuwait,
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
4These estimates assume that labor productivity rises by 1.5 percent per
year in all countries; were productivity to rise faster, smaller cuts in benefits
would be needed.
5Canadian immigration law sets a threshold of points above which applicants
are admitted, and allocates points to applicants according to their proficiency in
English and French, their education, work experience, and age.  Candidates have
two points deducted for each year that their age falls under 21 or exceeds 44.
6In a response to a U.N. survey, the governments of many developed countries
stated in 2001 that it was their policy to encourage higher birth rates (U.N. 2001).ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2004 63
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